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Abstract 
It is hypothesized that creativity arises from the self-mending 
capacity of an internal model of the world, or worldview. The 
uniquely honed worldview of a creative individual results in a 
distinctive style that is recognizable within and across 
domains. It is further hypothesized that creativity is domain-
general in the sense that there exist multiple avenues by 
which the distinctiveness of one’s worldview can be 
expressed. These hypotheses were tested using art students 
and creative writing students. Art students guessed 
significantly above chance both which painting was done by 
which of five famous artists, and which artwork was done by 
which of their peers. Similarly, creative writing students 
guessed significantly above chance both which passage was 
written by which of five famous writers, and which passage 
was written by which of their peers. These findings support 
the hypothesis that creative style is recognizable. Moreover, 
creative writing students guessed significantly above chance 
which of their peers produced particular works of art, 
supporting the hypothesis that creative style is recognizable 
not just within but across domains.  
Keywords: art; creative writing; creativity; Darwinian 
theory; expertise; heuristic search; honing; style; voice. 
Introduction 
The therapeutic nature of the creative process is well 
known. Eminent creators and laypeople alike often claim 
that through engagement in creative activities they gain a 
clearer sense of themselves as unique individuals. By 
making artistic choices, and observing how these choices 
guide subsequent thoughts about the work, eventually 
culminating in original, creative form, they acquire self-
knowledge, and often, are left with a sense of completeness. 
The transformation that occurs on canvas or on the written 
page is said to be mirrored by a sense of personal 
transformation and self-discovery that occurs within.  
Artists often find a style that feels as if it is ‘theirs’ only 
after periods of exploration with different media and 
established styles and art forms. Similarly, writers speak of 
transitioning from a stage in which they were merely 
imitating the styles of authors they admired to a stage in 
which they discovered their own authentic ‘voice’. This 
sense of self-discovery may seem to the creator as real as 
anything he or she has ever experienced, and the transition 
from merely imitating others to finding one’s own 
identifiable style is often evident to anyone exposed to an 
individual’s creative works. But although the phenomenon 
of recognizable creative style seems obvious to artists 
themselves, and to those who appreciate what they do, it is 
not predicted by well-known theories of creativity. 
This paper presents the results of preliminary experiments 
designed to test the hypothesis that creative individuals 
possess a distinctly recognizable creative style, and that this 
creative style is recognizable not just within a domain but 
across domains. We begin by discussing by well-known 
theories of creativity, and how the phenomena of individual 
style and ‘voice’ are not predicted by them. Three studies 
are then presented. The first two studies test the hypothesis 
that the phenomenon of creative style is real; that is, that 
creative individuals such as artists and writers genuinely 
exhibit a creative style that others come to associate with 
them. The third study tests the hypothesis that an 
individual’s creative style is recognizable not just in one 
domain, but across different domains. Finally, we discuss 
how the findings are compatible with a new theory of 
creativity.  
Theories of Creativity 
This section very briefly summarizes some leading theories 
of how the creative process works, and then presents a new 
theory of creativity referred to as honing theory.  
Creativity as Heuristic Search  
Inspired by the metaphor of the mind as a computer (or 
computer program), it was proposed that creativity involves 
a process of heuristic search, in which rules of thumb guide 
the inspection of different states within a particular state 
space (set of possible solutions) until a satisfactory solution 
is found (Eysenck, 1993; Newell, Shaw & Simon 1957; 
Newell & Simon 1972). In heuristic search, the relevant 
variables are defined up front; thus the state space is 
generally fixed. Examples of heuristics include breaking the 
problem into sub-problems, hill-climbing (reiteratively 
modifying the current state to look more like the goal state), 
and working backward from the goal state to the initial state. 
A variation on this is the view that creativity involves 
heuristics that guide the search for, not a possibility within a 
given state space, but a new state space itself (e.g., Boden, 
1990; Kaplan & Simon, 1990, Ohlsson, 1992). That is, it 
involves switching from one representation of the problem 
to another, sometimes referred to as restructuring 
(Weisberg, 1995).  
The Expertise View of Creativity  
Some posit that creativity involves everyday thought 
processes such as remembering, planning, reasoning, and 
restructuring; no special or unconscious thought processes 
need be postulated (Perkins, 1981; Weisberg, 2006). This is 
sometimes referred to as the expertise view of creativity 
because it stresses the extent to which creative acts draw 
upon familiarity with a particular domain of knowledge. 
Thus this view in particular is associated with the notion 
that creativity is highly domain-specific; expertise in one 
domain is not viewed as enhancing creativity in another 
domain. The expertise view is also associated with the 
notion that the creative process result in products that are 
largely derivative, or reproductive (as Weisberg puts it), as 
opposed to genuinely new, or productive. 
The Darwinian Theory of Creativity  
Another approach to modeling the creative process involves 
framing it in Darwinian terms. While some philosophers 
describe the growth of knowledge as Darwinian merely in 
the sense that conjectures must be refutable, i.e., able to be 
selected against (Popper, 1963; Lorenz, 1971), Campbell 
(1960) goes further, arguing that a stream of creative 
thought is a Darwinian process. The basic idea is that we 
generate new ideas through ‘blind’ variation and selective 
retention (abbreviated BVSR): ‘mutate’ the current thought 
a multitude of different ways, select the fittest variant(s), 
and repeat this process until a satisfactory idea results. The 
variants are ‘blind’ in the sense that the creator has no 
subjective certainty about whether they are a step in the 
direction of the final creative product.  
Currently the Darwinian view of creativity is most closely 
associated with Simonton (1998, 1999a,b, 2007a,b), who 
views creativity as essentially a trial-and-error process in 
which the most promising ‘blindly’ generated ideational 
variants are selected for development into a finished 
product. It should be noted that the endeavor to apply 
natural selection to creative thought is not without critics 
(Dasgupta, 2004; Eysenck, 1995; Gabora, 2005, 2007; 
Sternberg, 1998, Thagard, 1980; Weisberg, 2000, Weisberg 
& Haas, 2007). Nevertheless, the development of a creative 
idea can be said to be evolutionary in the very general sense 
that it exhibits descent with adaptive modification. 
The Honing Theory of Creativity 
Central to the honing theory of creativity is the notion of a 
worldview, by which we mean one’s internal model of the 
world, as well as one’s values, attitudes, predispositions, 
and habitual patterns of response (Gabora, 2000, 2004, 
2008, Gabora & Aerts, 2009). Honing theory posits that 
creativity arises due to the self-organizing, self-mending 
nature of a worldview, and that it is by way of the creative 
process the individual hones (and re-hones) an integrated 
worldview. Honing theory places equal emphasis on the 
externally visible creative outcome and the internal 
cognitive restructuring brought about by the creative 
process. Indeed one factor that distinguishes it from other 
theories of creativity is that it focuses on not just 
restructuring as it pertains to the conception of the task, but 
as it pertains to the worldview as a whole. When faced with 
a creatively demanding task, there is an interaction between 
the conception of the task and the worldview. The 
conception of the task changes through interaction with the 
worldview, and the worldview changes through interaction 
with the task. This interaction is reiterated until the task is 
complete, at which point not only is the task conceived of 
differently, but the worldview is subtly or drastically 
transformed. Thus one distinguishing feature of honing 
theory is that the creative process reflects the natural 
tendency of a worldview to seek integration or consistency 
amongst both its pre-existing and newly-added components, 
whether they be ideas, attitudes, or bits of knowledge; it 
mends itself as does a body when injured. 
The Recognizability of Creative Style 
Theories of creativity based on heuristic search, the 
acquisition of expertise, or chance, random processes, such 
as BVSR, give no reason to expect that the act of creation 
leads to a clearer or more integrated sense of self, or that the 
works of a particular creator should exhibit a unique and 
recognizable style. This is particularly so if, as is often 
claimed, creativity is strongly domain-specific (Baer, 1998; 
Sawyer, 2006; Weisberg, 2006). If creativity is limited to a 
particular domain then why should it result in a global sense 
of wellbeing or integration?  
Claims about the domain-specificity of creativity are 
based largely on findings that correlations amongst 
alternative measures of creativity are small, and expertise or 
eminence with respect to one creative endeavor is rarely 
associated with expertise or eminence with respect to 
another (e.g. Getzels & Jackson, 1962). Thus, for example, 
creative scientists rarely become famous artists or dancers. 
The focus of these studies is squarely on expertise or 
eminence as evidence of creative achievement. But what if 
creative achievement is measured not by expertise or 
eminence but by having found a way to express what is 
genuine and unique about us through whatever media we 
have at a given time at our disposal? One might expect that 
an artist’s or scientist’s personal style comes through in how 
he or she prepares a meal or decorates a room, what 
creativity researchers refer to as little-c (Richards, Kinney, 
Benet, & Merzel, 1988) or mini-c (Beghetto & Kaufman, 
2007) creative activities. Findings of domain-specificity in 
creativity may have more to do with the fact that we focus 
on creative achievement at a level that takes a decade or 
more to obtain (Simonton, 2007), as opposed to looking for 
evidence that creative potential and personal style 
transcends particular domains. In other words, looking for 
evidence of exceptional creativity in multiple domains is not 
the only or necessarily even the best way to address the 
question of whether creativity is domain-specific. Another 
way is to look for evidence that an individual exhibits a 
creative style in one domain that also ‘comes through’ when 
engaged in creative activities in other domains.  
Although the phenomenon of recognizable style or voice 
is not predicted by the view that creativity is a matter of 
heuristic search, expertise, or Darwinian selection, it is 
predicted by the honing theory of creativity. We have seen 
that, according to honing theory, creativity is the process by 
which one hones a worldview, and each idea the creator 
comes up with is a different expression of the same 
underlying core network of understandings, beliefs, and 
attitudes. A worldview has a characteristic structure, and the 
creator’s various outputs are reflections of that structure, 
and they are related to one another, and potentially pave the 
way for one another. Thus honing theory predicts that 
creative individuals have a recognizable style.  
There is evidence that human creativity is more consistent 
with honing theory than with competing theories of 
creativity with respect to developmental antecedents of 
creativity, personality traits of creative individuals, and 
studies of lifespan creativity (Gabora, under revision). This 
paper reports on the results of creative style experiments 
that provide further support for the theory. The goal of the 
first two studies was to find empirical evidence for the 
common belief that there really is such a thing as 
recognizable style or voice. Although artists have no doubt 
this is true, it has not been studied by psychologists, and as 
we have seen, most theories of creativity do not predict it. 
The goal of the third study was to test a more controversial 
prediction of honing theory, the prediction that the structure 
of a worldview manifests in a unique and recognizable way, 
to varying degrees, through different creative outlets. Thus 
for example, you might recognize someone’s art by 
knowing how they dress or decorate. 
Study 1: Within-domain Recognizability of Artistic 
Style 
The first study tested the hypothesis that individuals who 
are highly familiar with the art of a given artist will 
recognize other works by that artist that they have not 
encountered before. 
Method 
Participants The research was conducted with 10 University 
of British Columbia undergraduates majoring in art who 
were highly familiar with five well-known artists, and with 
each other’s art. 
 
Materials and Procedures Prior to the study, participants 
were instructed to bring from home a recently completed 
painting that they had never discussed with or shown to any 
of their classmates. They were asked to hide their signatures 
or any other identifying feature of the painting. Before the 
study, the paintings were examined to ensure that signatures 
and any other identifying features had been covered.   
At the beginning of the study, the art students were shown 
three well-known paintings by each of five well-known 
artists as a refresher. The well-known artists were Picasso, 
Monet, Van Gogh, Dahli, and Andy Warhol. These artists 
were decided upon because previous discussion with the 
class indicated that all students were highly familiar with 
them. The students were then shown ten unfamiliar (rare or 
newly completed) works that they had not studied in class. 
Signatures on all artworks were covered by black tape. The 
art students were given a questionnaire and asked to guess 
which famous artist did each painting. For each answer they 
were also asked to state how certain they were on a 3-point 
scale that they had not encountered the work before. 
They were also shown the paintings by their fellow 
classmates that they had never seen before. The rationale for 
showing classmates’ paintings was to control for the 
possibility that with the well-known artists, a participant 
who, though not recognizing the creative voice, might guess 
above chance levels to which era or country the artist 
belonged. The only sufficiently large number of artists from 
the same era and locale that the students were familiar with 
were their own classmates.  As with the famous artists, they 
were asked to guess which classmate did each painting, and 
to state how certain they were on a 3-point scale that they 
had not encountered the work before. 
The participants were debriefed, and the results were 
analyzed. If a participant had encountered a work before, or 
was uncertain about having encountered it before, the score 
for this question was not included in the analysis. Less than 
5% of scores were not included in the analysis. 
 
Analysis The data were analyzed to determine if the 
participants correctly identified the artists at above-chance 
levels. First, a proportion correct score for each participant 
was computed. For example, if a participant correctly 
identified seven out of 10 possible artists, the proportion 
correct score for that person was .70. Then, the proportion 
correct score that would have been obtained on the basis on 
random guesses for each question was computed. For 
example, for the well-known artists, since there were 5 of 
them, the proportion correct based on random guesses was 
.20. One-sample t-tests were then computed comparing the 
average proportion correct scores to the proportion correct 
values that would have been obtained had participants been 
randomly guessing. A one-sample randomization test 
(Manly, 2007) was used to compute the p-levels for these t-
test values, given the small sample sizes, and .05 was used 
as the criterion for statistical significance. 
Results 
The results are divided into two sections: recognition of 
famous artists, and recognition of classmates’ art.  
 
Recognition of Famous Artists For the task in which art 
students were asked which famous artist painted each 
painting, the mean proportion correct was .78 (SD = .12). 
The proportion correct that would have been obtained on the 
basis of random guesses was .20. This difference is 
statistically significant, t(9) = 15.3, p < .0001, r (effect size) 
= .98. Thus art students were able to distinguish above 
chance which famous artists created pieces of art they had 
not seen before. 	  
 
Recognition of Classmates’ Art A similar result was 
obtained with works of art by the students themselves. The 
mean proportion correct was .74 (SD = .29). The proportion 
correct that would have been obtained on the basis of 
random guesses is .11. This difference is significant, t(9) = 
6.8, p < 0.0001, r = .92. Thus art students also correctly 
identified their classmates’ art above chance.  
Study 2: Within-domain Recognizability of the 
Notion of a Writer’s ‘Voice’ 
This study tested the hypothesis that individuals who are 
highly familiar with the work of a given writer will 
recognize other works by that writer that they have not 
encountered before. 
Method 
Participants The research was conducted with seven 
University of British Columbia advanced undergraduate 
creative writing students who were highly familiar with five 
well-known writers, and with each other’s writing. 
 
Materials and Procedures The analogous procedure to that 
described above for art students was used for creative 
writing students. Prior to the study, they had been asked to 
write a passage about a kitchen and a poem about a month 
of the year. They were explicitly asked to include no 
immediately identifying content in their writing (e.g., no 
mention of surfing if it is known that they like surfing). 
These constituted their two pieces of writing. At the 
beginning of the study they were given three well-known 
written passages by each of ten well-known writers as a 
refresher. The well-known writers were Ernest Hemingway, 
Douglas Coupland, Emily Dickinson, Walt Whitman, Allen 
Ginsburg, Jack Kerouac, TS Eliot, Jane Austin, George 
Orwell, and Franz Kafka. These writers were chosen 
because previous discussion with the class indicated that all 
students were highly familiar with them. A sample of one of 
the written passages by well-known writers (in this case, 
Ernest Hemingway) that were provided to creative writing 
students as a refresher is provided in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Sample of written passage by well-known writer 
provided to creative writing students as a refresher. 
 
“If the book is good, it is about something that you know, and 
is truly written, and reading it over you see that this is so, you 
can let the boys yip and the noise will have that pleasant 
sound coyotes make on a very cold night when they are out in 
the snow and you are in your own cabin that you have built or 
paid for with your work.” 
 
The creative writing students were then shown twenty rare 
passages that they had not studied in class. A sample of one 
of the passages by well-known writers (in this case, Jane 
Austin) is provided in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Sample of written passage by well-known writer 
provided to creative writing students as a test of their ability 
to recognize writer’s style. 
  
“However, here they are, safe and well, just like their own 
nice selves, Fanny looking as neat and white this morning as 
possible, and dear Charles all affectionate, placid, quiet, 
cheerful, good humour. They are both looking very well, but 
poor little Cassy is grown extremely thin, and looks poorly. I 
hope a week's country air and exercise may do her good. I am 
sorry to say it can be but a week. The baby does not appear so 
large in proportion as she was, nor quite so pretty, but I have 
seen very little of her. Cassy was too tired and bewildered just 
at first to seem to know anybody. We met them in the hall -- 
the women and girl part of us -- but before we reached the 
library she kissed me very affectionately, and has since 
seemed to recollect me in the same way.” 
 
The creative writing students were also given the two 
pieces of writing by each of their fellow classmates (the 
passage about a kitchen and the poem about a month of the 
year) that they had never seen before. They were given a 
questionnaire, and asked to guess which famous writer 
wrote each passage in the first set of passages, and which 
classmate wrote each passage in the second set. For each 
answer, they were also asked to state on a 3-point scale how 
certain they were that they had not encountered the work 
before. 
Participants were debriefed, and the results were 
analyzed. As in the first study, if the participant had 
encountered the work before, or was uncertain about having 
encountered it before, the score for this question was not 
included in the analysis. Once again, less than 5% of scores 
were not included in the analysis. 
Results 
The results are divided into two sections: recognition of 
famous writers, and recognition of classmates’ writing.  
 
Recognition of Famous Writers For creative writing 
students exposed to passages by famous writers, the mean 
proportion correct was .34, (SD = .28). The proportion 
correct that would have been obtained on the basis of 
random guesses is .10. This difference is significant, t(7) = 
7.0, p < 0.0001, r = .94. Thus creative writing students 
correctly identified above chance passages by famous 
writers that they had not encountered before.  
 
Recognition of Classmates’ Writing A similar but less 
pronounced result was obtained with passages written by the 
students themselves. The mean proportion correct was .27 
(SD = .16). The proportion correct that would have been 
obtained on the basis of random guesses is .14. This 
difference is significant, t(7) = 2.3, p < 0.05, r = .66. Thus, 
creative writing students also correctly identified above 
chance passages written by classmates.  
Study 3: Cross-domain Recognizability of Style 
This experiment tested the hypothesis that familiarity with 
an individual’s creative work in one domain facilitates 
recognition of that individual’s creative work in another. 
Method 
Participants The same seven University of British 
Columbia advanced undergraduate creative writing students 
who participated in Study 2 also participated in Study 3. 
They were highly familiar with each other’s writing, but 
unfamiliar with each other’s art. 
 
Materials Each creative writing student brought one piece 
of covered art to the professor’s office. They were asked to 
hide their signature and any other identifying feature. Before 
the study, the paintings were examined to ensure that 
signatures and other identifying features had been hidden.  
 
Procedure The students were shown unsigned art done by 
classmates. They were given a questionnaire and asked to 
guess which classmate did which piece of art. As above, for 
each answer they were also asked to state on a scale of 1-3 
how certain they were that they had not encountered the 
work before. If they had seen the piece before, or thought 
they might have seen it before, their answer was not 
included in the analysis. Less than 5% of scores were 
discarded from the analysis. 
Results 
The mean proportion correct was .39 (SD = .27). The 
proportion correct that would have been obtained on the 
basis of random guesses is .17. This difference is 
significant, t(6) = 2.2, p < 0.03, r = .67. Thus creative 
writing students were able to identify above chance which 
of their classmates created a given work in a domain other 
than writing, specifically art. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
The experiments with artists and writers reported here 
provide support for the hypothesis that different works by 
the same creator exhibit a recognizable style or ‘voice’, and 
that this recognizable quality even comes through in 
different creative outlets. Art students were able to 
distinguish significantly above chance which famous artists 
created pieces of art they had not seen before. They also 
correctly identified their classmates’ art significantly above 
chance. Similarly, creative writing students correctly 
identified significantly above chance passages by famous 
writers that they had not encountered before, and correctly 
identified their classmates’ writing significantly above 
chance. Creative writing students additionally correctly 
identified significantly above chance works of art produced 
by classmates. (The opposite study, determining whether art 
students correctly identify written passages generated by 
their classmates, has not yet been carried out.) 
The higher recognizability of artistic style (study 1) than 
writer’s style (study 2) comes as a surprise. It cannot be 
entirely due to the famous artists coming from a wider range 
of eras and locales than the famous writers, for if that were 
the correct explanation, the recognizability of classmates’ 
art in Study 1 and classmates’ writing in Study 2 should 
have been comparable. Perhaps there are fewer constraints 
on artists, i.e. fewer demands that the work ‘make sense’, 
and it need not exhibit plot structure or character 
development. Thus there may be more acceptable ways of 
‘doing one’s own thing’. The analysis takes into account 
that there were twice as many writers to choose from as 
artists, but in future studies the number of famous artists and 
writers will be the same, in order to make the studies as 
comparable as possible.  
The results support the hypothesis that creators have a 
recognizable style. These findings are not predicted by 
theories of creativity that emphasize chance processes or the 
accumulation of expertise. If creative output is a matter of 
chance or the acquisition of expertise, then what is the 
source of this identifiable personal style? These findings are, 
however, predicted by honing theory, according to which 
personal style reflects the uniquely honed structure of an 
individual’s worldview. The finding that creative writing 
students were able to identify above chance which of their 
classmates created a given work in a domain other than 
writing, specifically art, supports the prediction that creators 
hone a uniquely structured worldview that exhibits a style 
that is recognizable not just within a domain but across 
domains. Further experiments are underway to replicate 
these findings with larger groups of participants, and adapt 
the general procedure to study the recognizability of style 
within and across domains using trained jazz musicians. 
It is worth pointing out explicitly how this approach, and 
in particular the investigation of recognizable cross-domain 
style, differs from typical attempts to determine to what 
extent higher cognition is domain-general versus domain-
specific, or modular. As mentioned in the introduction, it is 
commonly assumed that this issue can be resolved by 
determining to what extent ratings of expertise in one 
domain are correlated with ratings of expertise in another. 
An unspoken assumption here is that measurements of 
expertise are all that is needed to detect any sort of quality 
that might characterize or unify an individual’s creative or 
intellectual ventures, and indeed that the outputs of higher 
cognitive processes are objectively comparable. But the 
reality is that while manifestations of higher cognition are 
sometimes comparable, even quantitatively, often there is 
little objective basis for comparison. The present results 
suggest that higher cognition is domain general not in the 
sense that expertise in one enterprise guarantees expertise in 
another, but in the sense that there are multiple interacting 
venues for creative exploration and self-expression open to 
any individual, and through which that individual’s 
worldview may be gleaned. It may be that our potential for 
cross-domain learning is only just beginning to be exploited, 
through ventures such as the Learning through the Arts 
program in Canada, in which students, for example, learn 
mathematics through dance, or learn about food chains 
through the creation of visual art. It seems reasonable that if 
knowledge is presented in compartmentalized chunks, 
students end up with a compartmentalized understanding of 
the world, while if knowledge were presented more 
holistically, a more integrated kind understanding may be 
possible. 
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